MAJOR PERIODS OF CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY

Assist. Prof. Dr. Burak Özçetin
Dr. Ulaş Tol
M. Ali Çalışkan
Prof. Dr. Mustafa Özer
MAJOR PERIODS of CIVIL SOCIETY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT in TURKEY

by

Assist. Prof. Dr. Burak Özçetin
Dr. Ulaş Tol
M.Ali Çalışkan
Prof. Dr. Mustafa Özer
The CNP Project in Turkey

Research team:
Mustafa Özer, Project Director; Anadolu University, Professor of Economics
Sezgin Acıkalın, Anadolu University, Associate Professor of Economics
Ahmet Tiryaki, Anadolu University, Associate Professor of Economics
Nurcan Turan, Anadolu University, Associate Professor of Business Administration
Kasım Akbaş, Anadolu University, Assistant Professor of Law
Erkan Özata, Anadolu University, Assistant Professor of Economics
Burak Özçetin, Akdeniz University, Assistant Professor of Public Relations
Ayşe Hepkul, Anadolu University, Assistant Professor of Business Administration
Kadir Beyaztaş, Researcher, YADA Foundation
Mine Karakus, Anadolu University, Project Assistant, Doctoral Student in Sociology

Advisory Committee:
Davut Aydin, Anadolu University, Professor of Accounting and Finance
Mehmet Ali Çalışkan, Director of YADA Foundation
Dr. Uğras Ulaş Tol, Research Director, YADA Foundation
Ali Simsek, Anadolu University, Professor of Educational Communications and Technology
Zafer Erdoğan, Anadolu University, Professor of Marketing Communications
Prof. Dr. Ayşel Celikel, Director of Support for Modern Life Association
Sevim Conka, Educational Volunteers Foundation for Turkey
Güven Savul, Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions, Specialist
Muammer Niksarlı, National Union of Cooperatives of Turkey, General Director
Celal Ulgen, Union of Turkish Bar Associations, member of board of directors
Ahmet Özdemir Aktan, Turkish Medical Association, Chairman of Central Council
Zeki Bostancı, Turkish Statistical Institute, Istanbul Regional Director
Hasan Akdemir, Turkish Statistical Institute, Sectoral Statistics Team Responsible
Aysegül Ünügür, Association of Turkish Women, Head of Eskisehir Branch

The CNP Project in Turkey was funded by:
Anadolu University Economic and Social Research Center (A U-ESRC).

© The Johns Hopkins University Center for Civil Society Studies, 2014
All rights reserved

Suggested citation
# Table of Contents

**Preface** ........................................................................................................ ii

1. Introduction...................................................................................................... 1

2. Origins and Early History: The Late Ottoman Period (late 1800s – early 1900s).... 2

2.1. Period of Modernization and Reform ............................................................... 4

3. Early Republic (1923-1945) ............................................................................... 5


5. Revival of Civil Society (post-1980s) ................................................................. 8

6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 10

**Bibliography** ............................................................................................... 12
PREFACE

This is one in a series of working papers produced under the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project (CNP), a collaborative effort by scholars around the world to understand the scope, structure, financing, and role of the nonprofit sector using a common framework and approach. Begun in 1991 in 13 countries, the project continues to expand, currently encompassing more than 40 countries.

The working papers provide a vehicle for the initial dissemination of the CNP work to an international audience of scholars, practitioners, and policy analysts interested in the social and economic role played by nonprofit organizations in different countries, and in the comparative analysis of these important, but often neglected, institutions.

Working papers are intermediary products, and they are released in the interest of timely distribution of project results to stimulate scholarly discussion and inform policy debates. All of these Working Papers are available at ccss.jhu.edu.

The production of these Working Papers owes much to the devoted efforts of our project staff. The present paper benefited greatly from the contributions of Senior Research Associate Wojciech Sokolowski and CNP Project Manager Megan Haddock. On behalf of the project’s core staff, I also want to express our deep gratitude to our project colleagues around the world and to the many sponsors of the project over its lifetime.

The views and opinions expressed in these papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views or opinions of the institutions with which they are affiliated, the Johns Hopkins University, its Institute for Health and Social Policy and Center for Civil Society Studies, or any of their officers or supporters, or the series’ editors.

We are delighted to be able to make the early results of this project available in this form and welcome comments and inquiries either about this paper or the project as a whole.

Lester M. Salamon
Project Director
MAJOR PERIODS of CIVIL SOCIETY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT in TURKEY

by
Assist. Prof. Dr. Burak Özçetin
Dr. Ulaş Tol
M.Ali Çalışkan
Prof. Dr. Mustafa Özer

1. Introduction

Despite the fact that Islamic law and culture attach a great value to altruism and philanthropy (vakif), civil society in Turkey is relatively small in comparison to European countries. An explanation of this puzzle, suggested by the social origins theory (Salamon, Sokolowski & Anheier, 2000), lies in Turkish institutional history dominated by the central role played by the state. The state domination of the social and economic life during the Ottoman period hindered economic development of the country and negatively impacted the growth of civil society institutions. To overcome this economic backwardness, the reformist elements of the military and state bureaucracy instituted a series of radical reforms at the turn of the century to promote economic development (cf. Timberger, 1978). Although the new regime promoted civic associations that were instrumental to its development policies, the general curtailment of civil liberties continued to suppress the growth of the civil society sector in Turkey. This changed only during the 1980s, when relative political democratization opened new opportunities for civil society organizations to grow and take a more active role in Turkish society.

This paper traces the origins and development of civil society organizations (CSOs) and links it to the evolution of state power in Turkey. Accordingly, discussions of the development of civil society in Turkey fall into time periods corresponding to three modes in which the state power operated: the Late Ottoman Period (late 1800s to early 1900s), the Early Republican Era (1923-1945), the Transition to a Multi-Party System (1945-1960), the Period of Military Coups (1960-1980s), and the Revival of Civil Society (Post-1980s).

The first part of the paper analyzes the roots and the development of civil society sector during the Ottoman period, focusing on the role of social and political factors such as patrimonial state culture and weak public space. The second part examines the effect of modernization policies during the Early Republican Era on state-society relations and its consequences on civil society development. The third part discusses Turkey’s transition to a multi-party system, the 1960s and 1970s military interventions and the post-1980s revival of civic life.

1 Akdeniz University, Communication Faculty, Department of Public Relations, Antalya, Turkey.
2 Research Director, YADA Foundation.
3 Director of YADA Foundation.
4 Anadolu University, Economics and Administrative Sciences Faculty, Department of Economics, Eskişehir, Turkey.
Civil society organizations in Turkey have a long history that dates back to the Ottoman era. Foundations as philanthropic charities were organized independently from the state and created social networks outside of the political and economic realm, and were similar to contemporary civil society organizations. The Ottoman Vakıf (foundation) system was the foremost example of these establishments. The Vakıf, which carried out social, economic and cultural functions with “minimal governmental interference,” was one of the most important institutions in the Ottoman social system (Gürbüz, 2012: 202).

However, the role these organizations played in economy and society was curtailed by the power of the autonomous central state, independent from all social dynamics and society itself. The structure of the Ottoman state was characteristically patrimonial in which the periphery (society) was under the hegemony of the center (the state). As a result, Ottoman society lacked the intermediary bodies between the center and periphery that in many Western societies were tied to the interests of different socio-economic classes – such as aristocracy, bourgeoisie, or industrial workers. Instead, on the one side was a highly bureaucratized and centralized Imperial rule and its military power and on the other side was the unorganized agrarian population scattered over a vast land. The Empire was based on military expansion and the military members constituted the ruling elite class. Accordingly, conquests and military development were far more vital than economic and social development. The lack of intermediary social groups, an unorganized weak agrarian population in the periphery, and a strong bureaucratic military state had sharpened the center-periphery dichotomy and no space was left for the development of civil society (Aksit, Serdar & Tabakoglu, 2003).

This deeply rooted dichotomy in power relations between the central state and social “periphery” created a strong path of institutional tradition that has affected Turkish society up to modern times. The Ottoman political system did not allow the existence of any opposition or any control mechanism outside the state. Therefore, the source of legitimacy of the state was not the people but the military power of the state apparatus itself. The well-being of the people was bound to the well-being of the state. For that reason, protection of the status-quo was the foremost important issue and the Ottoman tradition adopted the legal and political norms that would protect the state’s power (Heper, 2006, Mardin, 2004, Inalcık, 2003).

The power of the Ottoman state apparatus was rooted in its control of the military recruitment system and land use (Özbudun, 1998). The key element of the military recruitment system was the Janissaries – enslaved boys and young men removed from their homes in the occupied territories and conscripted into the Ottoman army. Included here was the gathering of the sons of Christian families of conquered lands, converting them to Islam, and educating them to become high ranking military or bureaucratic officials – what was known as the Devshirme system (or blood tax). The recruitment of young men and boys from the territories further inhibited the emergence of a strong class of local aristocracy and bureaucratic elites.

The second element of state power was the complex institutional structure of Ottoman land use. The state owned and controlled the land, which was allocated to families in small units for cultivation.
As stated above, these arrangements were sustained because the Ottoman social structure lacked the intermediary bodies – a strong aristocracy and merchant class, a well-organized autonomous guild system, and independent religious organization and autonomous cities – that could control and challenge the autonomy of the central state.

These two elements are the key factors that inhibited development of capitalism and its social formation in the Ottoman state resulting in its economic backwardness vis a vis Western powers, which in turn hindered the development of civil society (Mardin, 1969).

More specifically, the economic system in the Classical Ottoman period (from the 14th to the end of the 18th century) was characterized by distinctive pre- and even anti-capitalist qualities, in which capital accumulation was inhibited by several factors – including the prohibition of the generation of interest in several areas of Ottoman economy, and strict control of prices and profit rates. Genç (2000: 75) notes that commerce was understood to be a public service in the classical Ottoman social system. Quataert (2005: 126) notes that while international commerce globally grew sixty-four times during the nineteenth century, the ratio was only ten- to sixteen-fold in the Ottoman Empire. The economy was characterized by limited commodity production and limited profit-making (Toprak, 1997: 222). Given these qualities, the Ottoman system was not only closed to capitalist development, but also opposed to it (Genç, 2009). The economy was centered on the concept of need and subsistence, and its three main principles were:

- **Provisionism**: Export was not a priority of the Ottoman economic policy. Not only in the 15th and 16th centuries, but in 17th and 18th centuries as well, the Ottoman Empire explicitly followed anti-mercantilist policies (Pamuk, 2005: 72). Protecting national markets against external competition was not a priority for the Ottoman rule. "The state regularly intervened in export, forcing quotas and special custom taxes on export goods." (Genç 2009: 192)

- **Fiscalism**: economic policy based on maximizing the treasury income.

- **Traditionalism**: the tendency to keep things as they are.

Coupled with extensive state control of production, which was based on control of labor and land, these qualities of the economic system were an impediment to capital accumulation in the Classical Period. The state’s control over the land was sustained through state ownership of the land and its allocation to families in small units for cultivation:

> "Although this structure began to shift in the 17th century with the emergence of large farms, most of these new farms were located in previously vacant lands outside settled areas. Considering the spread of big farms both an economic and a cultural threat, the peasantry and the state reacted against this shift and prevented the big farms from expanding into the villages. Small landholders continued to constitute the basic unit of agricultural production, and statistics indicate that land distribution in Anatolia and Rumelia preserved its egalitarian character until the end of the empire in the early 20th century." (Genç, 2009: 193)

Control over the labor, on the other hand, was sustained through guilds and monopoly licenses issued to guilds (gediks or patents) which helped limit the mobility of labor.
Genç notes that the Ottoman purchase regime was based more on fiscalism than provisionism. He also adds that during periods of peace this purchase regime had limited effects on the people, but in times of war and economic crises larger-scale craftsmen and tradesmen became more vulnerable to increasing demands of the state:

"During the era of defensive wars from the mid-18th century to the 1830s, these groups were made especially vulnerable as the official purchase regime was applied frequently, damaging high-production workshops. As ongoing wars decreased revenues, the state increased its demand for goods and services at reduced prices, creating a situation in which those workshops that showed the most growth were hardest hit by the demands of the government. This situation, in turn, effectively favored small producers and reinforced the egalitarian tendencies of the Ottoman economy." (Genç, 2009: 194)

Confiscation of private inheritances of the rich during wartime (through compulsory loans to be re-paid in peacetime) further hindered private capital accumulation, which is crucial for capitalist development. This is why, by the beginning of Tanzimat (Reform) in 1839 after 70 years of defensive wars, which coincided with the Industrial Revolution, the state had to undertake the production of goods and services through state-run companies.

"In addition to heavy investments for arms and ammunition production required by the new army, the state undertook the production of sailcloth, woolen fabrics, leather, garments, shoes, fezzes, paper, and other goods by setting up factories. It also entered into trade to finance the new army and these investments. The state monopolies that had started with a few goods at the beginning of the 19th century flourished with the inclusion of various new trade items, such as opium, wool, silk, olive oil, soap, and charcoal. In addition, the state assumed control of all trade in some regions, including Salonika and Antalya. These policies were without precedent in the classical system." (Genç, 2009: 195)

2.1. Period of Modernization and Reform
The domination of the economy by the central state during the Ottoman period created disincentive for economic development, which set the Turkish economy behind those of Western powers. To counteract this growing economic backwardness, the Turkish state embarked on modernization reform in the second half of the 19th century (Genç, 2009). These reforms marked increased internal and external integration of the Ottoman economy into European and world markets, which Zafer Toprak considers a turning point for the Ottoman social and economic system: this period marked the formation of the individual and society; the transformation of subjects into citizens; the emergence of “the people;” the opening of a closed economic system; the establishment of credit institutions and a modern banking system; consolidation of economic rationalism; and monetization of the economy (1997: 226-7). Alongside the centralization of political power and emergence of a modern state, these reforms facilitated the emergence of a dynamic social and economic system. All of these factors served to lay the foundation for the development of civic institutions in Turkish society.

Increased ties with the West during the 19th century reform process also resulted in a transformation of the state machinery with the emergence of a Westernized bureaucratic elite alongside the traditional Ottoman ruling classes. The 19th century was marked by Westernization movements among the elites. Elitist Westernization movements were criticized by the
lower classes as widening the already existing gap between the state and the subjects. However, both the forerunners of the Westernization movement and the leaders of the opposition, the Young Turks, were concerned with the well-being and the permanence of the state. Neither group envisioned a decentralization of central state power. The elites’ opinion simply shifted the focus from central state power materialized in the traditional rule of the empire to power held by the modern, bureaucratic, central state, leaving civic institutions in the same weak position as before.

What is more, the outcome of the administrative reforms that began in 1839 created an elitist despotic rule that prioritized Western values and culture as high culture, and modeled modernization of the state on the adoption of Westernization with a top-down fashion. The modernization and/or Westernization movement in the late Ottoman period was therefore an elite-driven project that lacked socio-economic factors that would support the emergence of formal civil society institutions.

As noted above, the Young Turks movement emerged in the second half of the 19th century in opposition to the rule of the monarchy. Originating among medical school students and military students in schools established by the state during the reform period, the Young Turks pursued a secularist, nationalist, and statist government. In 1908, the movement resulted in the creation of a new governing elite, though it did not change the emphasis on the consolidation of strong central state. Though this could be considered as a continuation of the Ottoman tradition, the social bases of the Young Turks and sources of their legitimacy were distinct from that of the traditional elites. The social engineering model that the movement adopted shifted the traditional rule of the sultan to the new centralized rule of the intellectual elites from the ranks of the bureaucracy and military. Still, little or no emphasis was paid to the peoples' will and civil society remained marginalized.

It is important to note that the shift to the military and bureaucratic rule did not change the nature of the relationship of state and society. The Ottoman legacy of strong state tradition was preserved during the period of modernization and westernization, and even up to the period of the establishment of the Republic in 1923. However, the 19th century modernization and Westernization process did bring considerable dynamism to Ottoman society and laid the groundwork for the rapid proliferation of associations and foundations in the early 20th century. Çaha (1995: 107) notes that in 1920, 40 different women’s associations were formed in the Ottoman Empire. However, these gains would soon be lost; the early Republican years will point to a step back in development of civil society in Turkey.

3. Early Republic (1923-1945)

The modernization efforts initiated in the second half of the 19th century culminated in radical political reforms initiated by army officer Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in response to the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. Following a successful military campaign against Western expeditionary forces in the Turkish War of Independence, Atatürk instituted a series reforms aiming at modernization of Turkish society and led to the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923 (Timberger, 1978). These reforms marked an important break in terms of the emphasis on the sovereignty of the people and the people as the source of the legitimacy of the state. Nevertheless, the young Republic inherited the political reflex of the Ottoman tradition. The statist approach that the interest of the state is above and beyond all social concerns, the re-
jection of all public demands, and the oppression of any opposition that would challenge the then-existing power continued to shape the social and political atmosphere.

In this atmosphere, the emergence of a weak civil society as a part of the modernization movement was only possible if it was organically tied to the state. The only association that survived in this period (1923-1946) was The People’s Houses (Halkevleri) which were responsible for disseminating information about the new regime’s values to society. Other organizations of the period that had originated in the Ottoman era, such as Türk Ocakları (Turkish Hearts Movement) and Türk Kadınlar Birliği (Turkish Women’s Union), were suppressed and closed down by the Kemalist regime (Zürcher, 2004: 180). Civil society during this period was constructed by state elites in a top down fashion and served as the main vehicle in the consolidation and promotion of the official state ideology. In the single party system of authoritarian state rule, the ruling elites enabled the emergence of a modern organized civil entity that could be held under the control of the state, and prevented the emergence of a civil society from the bottom that would challenge central rule (Icduygu, Meydanoglu, & Sert, 2011).

4. Transition to a Multi-Party System and Military Coups (1960-1980)

In 1946, the single party system was replaced by a multi-party system, which the Democrat Party (DP) won in the subsequent elections in 1950 replacing the 30 year dominance of the Republic People’s Party (CHP). "The Turkish political system of the 1940s was rooted in the period of national struggle of the early 1920s. It was the result of a tacit alliance between the urban middle class and the intelligentsia, army officers and state officials, and the landowners and notables of Anatolia."(Ahmad, 1977: 1-2). The members of this power bloc were disturbed by excessive state intervention in the 1940s in economic and social life:

"Statism, through its excesses and derivations from its initial social purpose, had become an obstacle to the development and the interests of all social groups. The benevolent paternalism of the Republican Party no longer corresponded with the need of any group. Their common purpose, not expressly stated but manifest in complaints, was to limit the government’s harmful functions and authority and then use the government for their own purposes. The middle class demanded freedom in economy. The peasants and workers demanded liberation from a system in which, though established to promote the welfare of all groups, had aided only some specific groups." (Karpat, 1959: 132)

Many argue that that prior to the 1950 election, the Republican People’s Party had lost its credibility in the eyes of the people. The price of the “politics of neutrality” during the Second World War was mostly paid by ordinary people. The coalition of opponents that originally formed during the Early Republican era was now ready to unite under a different project: the anti-statist and populist project of the Democratic Party (DP).

This marked a major turning point in the political history of the Turkish Republic. For the first time, the political powers felt the need to establish links with the periphery to counter to opposition by the DP (Mardin, 1973). This constituted a paradigm shift in the relations between the state and society. The DP’s political discourse as an opposition to the bureaucratic rule of the elite and the DP’s alliance with the periphery, constituted the dynamics of this paradigm
shift. However, this presented a dilemma for the DP: on the one hand, it needed to protect its public support. On the other hand, gaining power required that it not challenge the statist modernization of the bureaucratic elites. The 1950s were thus dominated by political and economic turmoil, with the conflict centering between the elitist bureaucratic intellectuals and the DP’s supporters. Ultimately, though the DP won the election in 1950, and subsequent elections in 1954 and 1957, the military assumed control in a 1960 coup.

This period was an important turning point in terms of democratization and freedom of organization. In particular, the 1946 Associations Law vitalized the realm of civil society, enabling associations and unions to operate relatively freely. Also, DP rule enabled the periphery to be included in the political system, thus relatively increasing the level of political participation (İçduygu et. al, 2011). However, during this period, the top-down fashion of state-led modernization prevailed which limited the development of a participatory grassroots civil society. In this decade, and like its predecessor, the DP continued to oppress civil society organizations which were critical of its policies. For instance, the DP repeatedly denied the Federation of Workers Union’s application to become part of international trade union confederations (İçduygu et. al, 2011). And the press was systematically oppressed by several regulations and laws issued throughout the 1950s. The result was that the post-1945 period was characterized by an imbalanced and weak civil society, with growth among those organizations affiliated with the central government and continued weakness for the grassroots organizations in the periphery.

As noted above, the 1960 military intervention ended DP rule and introduced a new constitution and new policies – including a Constitutional Court, a liberalized press law, a new trade union law, and autonomous universities – to check the excessive and unbalanced use of governmental authority. Compared to the former, the new Constitution and legal arrangements marked a considerable liberalization of the Turkish social and political system. Coupled with social and economic dynamism in the following two decades, this period (1960-1980) witnessed a crystallization of political ideologies, empowerment of organized working class (especially the foundation of DİSK-Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey in 1967), the emergence of students’ movements, and the rise of legal and illegal leftist opposition groups. In this sense, the legal and constitutional arrangements following 1960 military intervention, and social and economic dynamism of the 1950s, brought a considerable dynamism to civil society in Turkey.

However, the military intervention also meant a great blow to development of democracy and civil society in Turkey since it increased political and institutional autonomy of the military establishment (Sakallıoğlu, 1997). The formation of the National Security Council (which was comprised of the President, the Chief of Staff, the Prime Minister, and select members of the Council of Ministers) after the 1960 military intervention created a permanent presence and dominance of the military in making national security policy for decades. After the 1960 military intervention, the military intervened into politics twice, in 1971 and 1980. While the 1960 intervention sought to form an interim government and make some anti-democratic amendments to the constitution, the objective of the 1971 and 1980 interventions was to introduce a deliberately anti-democratic and authoritarian political regime.

5. Revival of Civil Society (post-1980s)
The military's re-writing of the 1982 Constitution of the Turkish Republic can be considered an attempt to establish a balance of individual liberty and state authority; however, the obvious result was that the 1982 Constitution solved this dilemma at the expense of the former (Soysal, 1992: 132). The purpose of the new Constitution and its respective laws, in large part, were to impede the development of civil society organizations and to strictly limit their activities. In particular, the Association Law of 1983 limited the rights of civil servants' membership in associations, and gave the state the authority to control and stop the activities of associations (İçduygü et. al., 2011). The military junta depicted an autonomous civil society as one of its primary enemies.

The maintenance of law and order and state authority was the military junta's motto, and they violently repressed social and political opposition to their power. The Generals' re-writing of the old constitution, which "did not fit" Turkey, further strengthened their power and squashed the development of civil society for two decades. First, the new Constitution introduced highly restrictive provisions on the political activities of trade unions, associations, and cooperatives. Second, the election system was modified to further strengthen the role of large political parties. Third, the 1982 Constitution transformed the office of the presidency from a ceremonial and symbolic one into a much more powerful one holding autonomous powers. Despite this development, it would inaccurate to call the new system "presidential" as it was between a parliamentary and presidential system.

Of course, the post-1980 adjustments were not limited to constitutional and legal arrangements. This peculiar break in Turkish history opened up a new epoch, which is labeled by Muharrem Tünay in his inspiring work as “the Turkish new right’s attempt at hegemony.” According to Tünay, a shift towards development based on export orientation, restructuring of law and order, emergence of a new individualism, deterioration of distribution of wealth, and the rise of the new-right politics pointed to an emergence of a new balance of power in Turkey (2002: 177).

Paradoxically, the post-1980 Turkey witnessed an unprecedented dynamism in civil society. As Keyman notes, Turkey faced a series of crises in the 1980s and 1990s that led to increased autonomy, proliferation, and further strengthening of civil society, despite the new legal restrictions. Important factors in this context included the prevalence of Neoliberalist thought (which undermined developmentalist and statist economic policies); the rise of identity politics (the rise of Islamist and Kurdish opposition in particular); and increased societal demand for democratization of state-society relations (2006: 27-28).

Within this context, a series of important developments and incidents played a decisive role in strengthening civil society and civil society discourse in Turkey, including:

- In 1996, the HABITAT Conference, held in Turkey, put civil society on the agenda of Turkish social and political life and also provided an avenue for Turkish civil society organizations to communicate with the global network.
• The Susurluk Scandal\(^7\) in 1996 exposed the deeply hidden structures within the state and surfaced previously concealed relationships between the government, the armed forces, the police, and organized crime. Several demonstrations were organized to protest the exposed corruption and illegal activities. For several months, participants in the popular nation-wide movement would regularly, and simultaneously, turn off their lights for "one minute for the sake of perpetual light."

• In response to what it perceived as the encroachment of Islam into Turkish politics, on **28 February 1997** the military declared Islamist reactionism as the number one security threat, forced the resignation of Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, and recommended a set of policy measures. The military was not alone in its campaign; on the contrary, to achieve its takeover of power it mobilized "former President Süleyman Demirel (1993-2000), the civil societal network of the secular establishment, the media, and large sectors of the populace" against Islamic reactionism which accordingly "constitute[d] the chronic, if at times undetectable, malaise of the Turkish polity." (Cizre and Çınar, 2003: 310-312) The policy measures of the 28 February process have been summarized by Cizre and Çınar (2003: 312) as such:

> "All primary and secondary school curricula were altered so as to emphasize both the secularist history and character of the republic and the new security threats posed by political Islam and separatist movements. Teaching on Atatürkism was expanded to cover all courses taught at all levels and types of schools. The secondary school system for prayer-leaders and preachers (im-amhatip) was scrapped and an eight year mandatory schooling system was introduced. Appointments of university chancellors since 1997 were pointedly made from among staunch Kemalists. Teaching programs on Kemalist principles, the struggle against reactionism, and national security issues were also extended to top bureaucrats and prayer leaders. Finally, military institutions and personnel were actively involved in administering the programs."

28 February resulted in the militarization of civil society through the engagement of secular CSOs in the military's agenda on the one hand, and the introduction of restrictions targeting Islamic CSOs on the other.

• The earthquake disaster on **17 August 1999** that killed 17,000 people and left millions homeless also altered the image of the state. State institutions lacked the capacity and resources to deal with such a tremendous disaster. Several national and local CSOs filled the gap in rescuing and channeling assistance to the victims. Civil initiatives, such as the AKUT (Search and Rescue Association), proved more effective and well-organized in the search and rescue effort. As the reactions and criticisms to the state mechanisms mounted, state representatives responded by accusing the NGOs of "showing off." The public became disillusioned with the state as its protective and omnipotent image was largely destroyed. At the same time, public opinion of civil society changed for the positive and trust and support for civil society initiatives increased.

---

\(^7\) "The scandal surfaced with a car crash on 3 November 1996, near Susurluk, in the province of Balıkesir. The victims included the deputy chief of the Istanbul Police Department, a Member of Parliament who led a powerful Kurdish clan, and the leader of the Grey Wolves (who was a contract killer on Interpol’s red list).” “Susurluk Scandal”

• Turkey’s EU accession process played a crucial role in strengthening democratic politics and civil society in Turkey. The European Council granted Turkey candidacy in 1999 in Helsinki, and in the following years Turkey initiated fundamental political reforms to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria.

"From 2001 to 2004, various political reform packages were adopted in order to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria that resulted in deepening Turkey’s Europeanization process. These reforms could be summarized under the broader headings of increased legal protection of social, cultural and political rights of all Turkish citizens irrespective of religious and ethnic origin, the role of the military in Turkish politics, and freedom of expression in Turkey. These reforms automatically brought to the foreground the dominant cleavages in Turkey, most notably that between Turkish nationalism versus recognition of other ethnic groups in Turkey, in particular the Kurds, and between secular and conservative political groups."

(Baç, 2009: 21-22)

The government started with liberalizing the law of associations which facilitated the proliferation of civil society organizations. Also, the EU accession process contributed to the still-ongoing process of shifting the state’s perception of civil society as an enemy or rival to the state, to its ally. Finally, the EU accession process, through international partnerships, joint-actions and various funds, contributed to strengthening and opening up civil society in Turkey.

• In 2001, Turkey suffered a severe economic crisis with devastating socio-economic outcomes including high unemployment, increased poverty, and political dissent towards the political system. While confidence in the government eroded with the economic crisis, the traditional understanding of a strong state began to be replaced by an understanding that Turkey required a more accountable, transparent, and efficient state. Even though a direct linkage between the crisis and civil society organizations cannot be constructed, the increased emphasis on democratization and restructuring of the state put CSOs on the agenda as important actors in the process of democratization.

6. Conclusion

Since the mid-1980s, Turkey has experienced a rapid socio-cultural, economic, and political transformation. One of the significant dimensions of this transformation is the progress of the civil society organizations both in terms of quality and quantity. The 1990s represented a turning point when economic activities, social groups, and cultural identities obtained relative autonomy within the public space. The revolutionary, future-oriented massive political movements of 1970s were, by 1990, replaced by the politicized issues of everyday matters. For the first time, animal rights, environmental protection, healthcare problems, family violence – which were private concerns of individuals – were brought into the political agenda.

From 2000s on, and especially with the EU accession process, the politicization of ethnic and religious identities, natural disasters, and economic crisis revealed the fact that the state-sponsored modernization process did not generate effective solutions to social problems. The Turkish State faced a legitimacy crisis in the realms of politics, economy, and culture. Public
support for the political parties weakened. All these developments increased the significance of civil society in Turkish life.

Throughout its history, the Turkish state prevented the establishment of a free public space and institutionalized autonomous civil society for the sake of its own preservation. The continuation of Ottoman heritage throughout the Republican era resulted in a state-led development of a weak, dependent civil society. The only role of the CSOs of that time was to promote the hegemonic state ideology and become driving actors of the state-led elitist modernization movement. The preservation of the wellbeing of the state, and the priority of the state over people, prevailed during the multi-party system up until 1990s. The massive leftist opposition movements of student and workers in the 1960s and 1970s were regarded as a threat to the state authority and were repressed by the coup d'états of 1960, 1971, and 1980. The tension between the center and the periphery, and the oppression of every oppositionist attempt from the periphery highlights the fact that, in the Turkish political tradition, any form of social opposition is regarded as antagonistic to the regime. This strong and deep-rooted understanding resulted in adoption of restrictive measures against the development of an autonomous civil society throughout Turkish history, and continues to be felt to this day.
Bibliography


Heper, Metin (2000). The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics. *Journal of International Affairs* 54(1).


Mardin, Şerif (1973) “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key To Understand Turkish Politics,” *Daedalus*, Winter.


Soysal, Mümtaz (1992) 100 Soruda Anayasanın Anlами, Gerçek: İstanbul.


THE JOHNS HOPKINS COMPARATIVE NONPROFIT SECTOR PROJECT

Project Director: Lester M. Salamon
Senior Research Associate: S. Wojciech Sokolowski
Project Manager: Megan Haddock

PROJECT FUNDERS

Academy of Finland
Aga Khan Foundation
Andalou University (Turkey)
Arab Gulf Fund (AGFUND)
The Atlantic Philanthropies
Australian Bureau of Statistics
Australian Research Council
Austrian Science Foundation
Canadian Fund (Slovakia)
Charities Aid Foundation (United Kingdom)
Civil Society Development Foundation (Czech Republic)
Civil Society Development Foundation (Romania)
Civil Society Development Foundation (Slovakia)
Colombian Center on Philanthropy
The Combined Community Trusts (New Zealand)
Department of Welfare (South Africa)
Deutsche Bank Foundation (Germany)
FIN (Netherlands)
Fondation de France
Fondation Roi Baudouin (Belgium)
Ford Foundation
Foundation for an Open Society (Hungary)
Fundación Andes (Chile)
Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco (Colombia)
Fundación Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (Spain)
Fundación FES (Colombia)
Fundación Minera Escondida (Chile)
Gerbert Rüf Stiftung (Switzerland)
Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation (Portugal)
Humboldt Foundation/Transcoop (Germany)
Imagine Canada
Industry Commission (Australia)
Institute for Human Sciences (Austria)
Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario (Chile)
Inter-American Development Bank
Inter-American Foundation
Juliana Welzijn Fonds (Netherlands)
Kahanoff Foundation (Canada)

W.K. Kellogg Foundation
Körber Foundation (Germany)
Luso-American Development Foundation (Portugal)
Ministry of Church and Education (Norway)
Ministry of Culture and Sports (Norway)
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (Netherlands)
Ministry of Environment (Norway)
Ministry of Family and Children (Norway)
Ministry of Family/World Bank (Venezuela)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Norway)
Ministry of Health, Sports and Welfare (Netherlands)
Ministry of Social Affairs (Denmark)
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health (Finland)
Ministry of Social Development (New Zealand)
C.S. Mott Foundation
National Department of Planning (Colombia)
National Research Fund (Hungary)
Norwegian Research Council
OPEC
Open Society Foundation (Slovakia)
David and Lucile Packard Foundation
Ilídio Pinho Foundation (Portugal)
Productivity Commission (Australia)
Research Council of Norway
Rockefeller Brothers Fund
Joseph Rowntree Foundation (United Kingdom)
Sasakawa Peace Foundation (Japan)
SENAC (National Commercial Training Service – Brazil)
Servicio de Cooperación Técnica (Chile)
The Skoll Foundation
Telefonica CTC Chile
The Tindall Foundation (New Zealand)
United Nations Development Program (Chile)
United States Agency for International Development
United States Information Service
University of Witwatersrand (South Africa)
Yad Hadaniv Foundation (Israel)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Korea, Rep. of</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies is a leading source of ground-breaking research and knowledge about the nonprofit sector, social investing, and the tools of government. Working in collaboration with governments, international organizations, investment innovators, and colleagues around the world, the Center encourages the use of this knowledge to strengthen and mobilize the capabilities and resources of the public, nonprofit, and for-profit sectors to address the complex problems that face the world today. The Center conducts research and educational programs that seek to improve current understanding, analyze emerging trends, and promote promising innovations in the ways that government, civil society, and business can collaborate to address social and environmental challenges.

COMPARATIVE NONPROFIT SECTOR PROJECT

The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project is a systematic effort to analyze the scope, structure, financing, and role of the private nonprofit sector in countries around the world in order to enrich our understanding of this sector, and to provide a sounder basis for both public and private action towards it.

Begun in 1991, this project grew out of an increased need for basic information about civil society organizations following a dramatic “associational revolution.” This revolution forced a reappraisal of the respective roles of the market and the state focused new attention on the role of private, nonprofit organizations; however, despite this growing importance, these organizations remained poorly understood almost everywhere, making it difficult to determine their capabilities or to attract attention to their challenges.

To address the need for improved data, the project launched by working with teams of local researchers in 13 countries to produce the first systematic body of internationally comparative data on CSOs, philanthropy, and volunteerism. Now operating in more than 45 countries, spanning all of the world’s continents and most of its major religious and cultural traditions, this project has produced a rich body of comparative data and the Johns Hopkins Global Civil Society Index, several books, and more than 60 published working papers written or edited by Center Staff and Local Associates.